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Abstract: Visual perception relies on stored information and 
environmental associations to arrive at a determinate representation of 
the world.  This opens up the disturbing possibility that our visual 
experiences could themselves be subject to a kind of racial bias, 
simply in virtue of accurately encoding previously encountered 
environmental regularities. This possibility raises the following 
question: what, if anything, is wrong with beliefs grounded upon these 
prejudicial experiences? They are consistent with a range of epistemic 
norms, including evidentialist and reliabilist standards for justification. 
I argue that we will struggle to locate a flaw with these sorts of 
perceptual beliefs so long as we focus our analysis at the level of the 
individual and her response to information. We should instead broaden 
our analysis to include the social structure within which the individual 
is located. Doing so lets us identify a problem with the way in which 
unjust social structures in particular “gerrymander” the regularities an 
individual is exposed to, and by extension the priors their visual 
system draws on. I argue that in this way, social structures can cap 
perceptual skill. 
0. Introduction 
Had Venus Williams been born a hundred years earlier, it is unlikely she would ever have learnt to play 
tennis. The skills an individual possesses depend on the social structure in which she is located: even our 
basic motor skills depend on the opportunities our social situation allows for their development.  
What about visual perception? Does how good a seer I am depend on the social milieu in which I 
was raised or am located? Focusing on the eye as the gateway to visual experience encourages us to think 
that the epistemic power of an individual’s experiences depends on facts internal to that individual and 																																																								
1 I am greatly indebted to Dan Greco, Susanna Siegel and above all Jason Stanley for detailed feedback on earlier 
drafts of this paper. I am also grateful to an anonymous referee for this journal for extremely helpful comments. For 
additional discussion of the material I am grateful to Rima Basu, Tamar Gendler, Liam Kofi-Bright, Zoe Jenkin, 
Kate Vredenburgh and Timothy Williamson. I also benefitted from discussion with audiences at the University of 
Maryland “Social Minds” graduate conference, an NYC Epistemology / Psychology Conference, a workshop at 
Cornell on Bayesian Theories of Perception and Epistemology, and the NYU Philosophy of Mind discussion group.  
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their visual system. Contrary to this, I claim that social structures can make us better or worse at seeing. 
In particular, unjust social structures cause their members to be less perceptually skilled. This can happen, 
moreover, even as the individual and her visual system conform to a range of epistemic norms for 
information gathering and processing. We can only trace the root of these epistemic failings, therefore, 
when we locate our critique at the level of social structures rather than the individual. 
This insight has payoffs for our understanding of prejudicial belief. Compelling rational 
arguments are sometimes made for prejudicial beliefs, from statistical facts of some kind or other.2 If you 
believe certain groups are violent, (so goes the argument), because they do in fact commit more crime 
than others, what epistemic flaw could there be with the resulting belief?  
Tamar Gendler (2011) addresses this more general version of the problem. Gendler considers the 
epistemic costs that arise from encoding base rates from your environment when you live in a racist 
society. In this paper I address a specific version of this more general problem that arises in the case of 
perceptual belief. According to dominant models of visual perception, statistical learning underlies our 
perceptual skills. As a result, there are analogous cases of prejudicial perceptual belief, in which visual 
experiences reflect priors absorbed from an individual’s environment. My aim in this article is to explain 
why visual experiences of this kind are epistemically flawed.  
Why address the problem in this specific, perceptual form? Firstly, we often appeal to perception 
as an independent source of information about the world, capable of resolving errors in belief. 
Appreciating that perceptual experiences too can encode and mirror flaws in our environment therefore 
intensifies the problem. Secondly, and relatedly, addressing the problem in the case of perception 
demonstrates the reach of the negative epistemic consequences of living in an unjust society. They arise 
even for such “ground-level” skills as perception.  
																																																								
2 This argument is common in informal settings, but it has parallels in academic settings too, and in particular in 
research in social psychology arguing that beliefs about stereotypes are often reasonably accurate. See for instance 
Lee Jussim’s extensive body of research on the statistical accuracy of a range of stereotypic beliefs (Jussim 2009, 
Lee et al. 1995, Madon et al. 1998). 
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Susanna Siegel in her (2017) argues that individuals may have prejudicial mental states, including 
visual experiences, that are ill-founded because they inherit flaws in the information upon which they are 
based. The individual receives this information, in a form of testimony, from the social structures within 
which she is embedded. Siegel is realistic about the many ways in which information is distorted by the 
flawed practices of both individuals and social structures. By contrast, the problem this paper confronts 
starts from an idealization: the notion that the visual system performs perfect statistical learning, and that 
this is sometimes what grounds prejudiced beliefs. Of course these idealizations are not borne out in the 
real world. But it is worth making them in order to throw into relief the way in which social structures 
constrain perceptual skill, no-matter how ideal the functioning of the visual system or individual believer.  
I proceed as follows. I begin, in the first section, with the background ecology of the problem. 
Our processing limitations compel reliance on base rates, both in the cognitive and the perceptual sphere. 
Those base rates reflect regularities in an individual’s environment. In the second section I set out in 
detail the conundrum that gives rise to: perceptual reliance on base rates leaves us vulnerable to what I 
shall call Technically Unimpeachable Prejudicial Experiences, or TUPES for short. These visual 
experiences reflect regularities to which the individual has been exposed. By doing so they are liable to 
perpetuate or rationalize the very flaws in the status quo which give rise to the statistical regularities that 
ground them. Yet, it is hard to find grounds for epistemic criticism of TUPEs, or of beliefs based upon 
them.  
In the third section I present a solution: unjust social structures make individuals less skilled at 
seeing. They do so by gerrymandering the priors on which the visual system relies. The flaw is epistemic, 
and though it manifests in the individual, its source is in the social structure within which the individual is 
situated. The upshot of this analysis is that structural injustice circumscribes the proper functioning of the 
visual system.3  
																																																								
3 In Charles Mill’s 2007 “White Ignorance”, he observes how naturalized epistemology prompted a challenge to the 
exclusion of the social, or “supraindividual” from the individualist orientation of traditional epistemology. Mills 
argues that the placement of the individual within a racialized social structure impacts on his or her perception and 
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1. Information and perception 
Traditionally, epistemology has granted perceptual experiences a special epistemic status. Visual 
experiences justify belief, but are not themselves appropriate loci for the kinds of epistemic evaluation we 
apply to belief itself.4 Though certain philosophers take the reliability of perceptual processes to be 
relevant to the justificatory power of visual experiences, visual states and processes have not generally 
been viewed as evaluable in terms of rationality.5 That assumption is challenged by Susanna Siegel, who 
draws attention to our intuitions that certain routes to experience are illicit in virtue of the transformations 
between pre-perceptual states, in a manner akin to irrational belief transformations. From that starting 
point, she argues for the rational evaluability of visual experiences themselves (Siegel 2013, 
forthcoming).  
Siegel mobilizes the possibility of certain empirical phenomena as a means of exposing novel 
kinds of epistemic flaws that can arise in perceptual experience. Siegel’s focus is on cognitive 
penetration, conceived as an unusual or aberrant feature of perceptual processing. I focus instead on a 
phenomenon that is an indispensible element of perception, visual statistical learning. Visual statistical 
learning allows that our experiences could becomes vehicles for bias and prejudice not because they are 
hijacked by cognitive attitudes with those flaws, but simply by encoding regularities in the environment.  
Most racist and sexist beliefs are epistemically flawed because they are precisely not grounded in 
likely or even possible rational interpretations of an agent’s environment. We do not need a special 
epistemic story to explain why beliefs that are false, or formed in clearly epistemically deviant ways, are 
problematic. In the face of most prejudicial belief, we can dislodge any worry of its rational basis by 
appeals to the standard apparatus of epistemological critique.  
																																																																																																																																																																																		
cognition. This paper could be read as a cashing out in detail of his claim that “…when the individual cognizing 
agent is perceiving, he is doing so with eyes and ears that have been socialized” (2007:24). 
4 This tradition is most clearly exemplified by foundationalist approaches to justification which allow that perceptual 
experience provides non-inferential justification for a set of beliefs, from which other beliefs can receive inferential 
justification. For contemporary articulations of the view see Audi (2003), Plantinga (2000).  
5 For instances of reliabilist approaches to perceptual justification see Goldman (1979, 1986) and Lyons (2009). 
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But could there be perceptual experiences that seem racially biased, or sexist, but which are based 
on priors that, as a result of statistical learning, do accurately represent the agent’s environment? In this 
section I lay out elements of vision science that suggest this is a possibility.  
The importance of spelling out why visual perception of this sort does not allow a rational route 
to prejudicial beliefs is not contingent on many or even any actual cases of such belief resting on this 
basis. By showing that this route to prejudicial belief is also not rational, we show that perhaps the most 
salient means of defending such beliefs, namely that the generalizations upon which they rest are true, 
cannot be sustained.  
Humans are cognitively limited epistemic agents, confronted with a basic task: that of acquiring 
information.6 Our cognitive limitations play a role in determining what constitutes a good strategy for that 
task. In light of those limitations, an optimal epistemic agent must retain information, and draw on it to 
efficiently search for and interpret new data.7 Stored information helps us efficiently acquire new 
information. Sometimes it does so by guiding search, pointing us towards likely sources or locations of 
further information: your knowledge of your colleagues’ expertise efficiently guides your search for 
relevant literature when compiling a syllabus, for instance. Alternatively, sometimes we do not know 
what our “information” is, in the sense that we have to work to extract the signal – that is, the information 
we are after – from a given body of data. At this stage too we can use stored information to help us 
distinguish what is likely to be signal from what is likely to be noise: given your friend’s calm 
disposition, the sudden cessation of a phone-call is probably a fault with the phone’s reception, not a 
response to something you have said. If we accept every piece of incoming data as signal, however 
improbable, we are more likely, in certain circumstances, to misrepresent the stimulus than if we 
disregard some input as noise. Sometimes, stored information also allows us to effectively interpret 																																																								
6 For an empirical overview of those cognitive and perceptual limitations see Chun and Wolfe (2001), Klingberg 
(2000), Marois and Ivanoff (2005). 
7  I prefer to use the more neutral term “information” to the contested and normatively freighted “evidence”. 
Information is intended to be a more inclusive term: not all information will meet the normative standards set on 
evidence. And information can include data available not at the person-level but exclusively to a sub-system of an 
individual. Retinal input, for instance, is a form of information, though we might hesitate to call it evidence. 
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incoming information and draw inferences from it. As a result, what you learn from new data depends on 
what you already know. Stored information could take many forms: a propositional belief, conscious or 
unconscious; an isolated conceptual association; a conceptual schema;8 or a loose grouping of 
associations around a concept whose activation readies the identification of other, related properties.  
Our visual experiences are subject to some of the same pressures as our cognitive processes of 
gathering information. The visual system faces its own processing limitations. The visual input available 
at any one moment far outstrips the brain’s capacity to process it (Summerfield and Egner 2009). Just as 
we maximize our cognitive informational gain by drawing on old information in the interpretation of new, 
so it has been claimed that the visual perceptual system maximizes its extraction of information from a 
given input by drawing on previously encoded information (Davenport and Potter 2004, Woodman et al. 
2013). Stored information directs the focus of the visual system towards the most likely relevant stimulus 
via contextual priming and the direction of attention, helping it to select for further processing the retinal 
input most likely to provide rewarding information.  
At the same time, the signal the visual system does process is noisy, and essentially ambiguous. It 
receives retinal information from the external world and on the basis of that must attempt to reconstruct 
the distal stimulus. However, there is no function from distal stimulus to retinal stimulation. The mapping 
is instead many to many: the same object may produce different retinal stimulation on different occasions, 
and conversely different objects may give rise to the same retinal input. By relying on previously 
encountered environmental regularities, the visual system is able to narrow the space of possibilities to 
resolve that ambiguity in incoming data (Scholl 2005, Feldman 2014).  
 The exact nature of the visual system’s sensitivity to those environmental regularities is 
contested.  In what follows I will predominantly talk in terms of  “Constructivist” models of perception, 
because of their current dominance in the empirical literature, and because of the clarity of their 
commitments to the role of stored information. These models foreground the visual system’s reliance on 																																																								
8 Conceptual schema, or schema concepts, are “cognitive structures of organized prior knowledge, abstracted from 
experience with specific instances” hypothesized to guide the processing of new information and retrieval of stored 
information (Fiske and Lanville 1980:543). 
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stored information, or “priors”, that encode the environmental regularities the organism has previously 
encountered.9 They are committed to the claim that the visual system “constructs” representations of the 
external world by interpreting sparse retinal input in light of prior information about the likelihood of 
various competing hypotheses, inferring on that basis the most likely distal stimulus. On these models, the 
experiential percept is the result of both incoming sensory data and stored perceptual information, with 
the balance between the two depending on the quality of sensory input: as the input degrades, stored 
information may be relied upon more heavily (Fan et al. 2016).  
Many constructivist models claim that visual processing is probabilistic: it integrates incoming 
retinal data with information about the relative likelihood that the incoming patterns of light were caused 
by this or that distal stimulus, and the initial output of that calculation is itself a probability distribution, 
representing the probability of various hypotheses for the distal stimulus, conditional on the pattern of 
incoming information.10 On its own, then, the integration of incoming and stored information fails to 																																																								
9 Constructivist accounts are distinguished from non-constructivist accounts by their emphasis on the claim that 
visual perception is underdetermined by the retinal data (Rescorla 2015). That claim is grounded in their 
distinctively sparse characterization of the relevant stimulus, as the light instantaneously received at the retina. On 
Constructivist models, that incoming information must be combined with priors characterized as representational in 
nature, via genuinely inferential processes. (Constructivist models take many more specific forms but for an 
accessible overview see Hoffman (1998), and for excellent critical discussion see Orlandi (2014)). 
What really matters for the purposes of the puzzle I explore in sections two and three is the importance of 
previously encountered environmental regularities to visual perception, and that commitment is shared in some form 
by many non-constructivist accounts. For instance, ecological approaches or Gibsonian approaches allow that the 
perceptual system adapts through both evolution and perceptual learning to its environment (Warren 2005:340). 
They deny the need for internal representation of that environment, claiming instead that the perceptual system 
directly adjusts to environmental regularities, becoming attuned to its surroundings in a manner that allows the 
organism to act effectively (Orlandi 2014, Warren 2012). In this way, these accounts minimize the indeterminacy 
the visual system faces when compared with their Constructivist counterparts, but they do so in part via appeal to the 
role of predictable environmental regularities filling the shortfall in retinal information highlighted by constructivist 
accounts. (In addition the characterize the stimulus as gathered over an extended period of time, allowing the subject 
to occupy multiple, slightly different perspectives on the same scene, thereby vastly increasing the available sensory 
signal (Gibson 1979).) Those same environmental regularities are the chief part of the information constructivists 
claim is captured in priors. As a result, though I continue to talk in terms amenable primarily to constructivist 
accounts, the problem I describe should just as surely trouble ecological accounts of perception, given their reliance 
on environmental regularities in making perception possible.  
 
10 Within probabilistic approaches, these learning processes are frequently modeled along specifically Bayesian 
lines. According to these Bayesian models of visual processing, the integration of incoming and stored information 
takes place in line with Bayes’ theorem (p(h | e) = p(e | h) p(h)), to calculate a probability distribution over a range 
of competing hypotheses concerning the nature of the distal stimulus, and to update the stored likelihoods.10 These 
Bayesian models are a subset of probabilistic models more generally, which posit some integration of stored and 
incoming information resulting in a distribution of probabilities across competing hypotheses, but which do not 
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privilege a single determinate percept. That requires the selection of some point on, or section of that 
probability distribution as the determinate experiential percept. That selection is done by a “loss” or 
“cost” function, (sometimes also called a “decision rule”). The loss function selects from among the 
hypotheses in the posterior distribution, on the basis of the relative costs of possible errors in a given 
context (Feldman 2014, Rescorla 2015).11  
Nonetheless, on these models priors play a crucial role in determining what individuals end up 
seeing, both by filling in gaps in incoming information, and by guiding attention and search within a 
scene (Goldstone 1998). To see this, consider the following image: 
 
																																																																																																																																																																																		
necessarily model that integration along specifically Bayesian lines. Bayesian models of perceptual processing have 
driven an extensive research program, one on which I shall draw, but nothing hangs, for my purposes, on whether 
vision is best modeled as relying on specifically Bayesian principles of integration or some other looser set of 
probabilistic principles. Although many Bayesian accounts of perception are constructivist, note that Orlandi 
(forthcoming) claims that Bayesian postulates need not be representational, and that ecological models of perception 
are in fact instances of Bayesian models.  
11 A “Bayesian” decision rule selects the a-posterior probability with the highest expected gain (Mamassian et al. 
2002). What that decision rule looks like will depend on the task in question and the possible gains and losses in a 
given context. Perhaps the simplest loss function just selects the maximum a-posterior probability (the ‘MAP’) as 
the relevant percept. But if errors in one direction carry a higher cost than errors in another direction, then another 
cost function will better maximize expected gain (Maloney (2001) offers an example in which you are walking on a 
path beside a steep cliff, for instance, and misjudging distance to one side could result in death whilst misjudging the 
distance to the other would merely result in safely steeping off the path onto the grassy verge). What factors 
determine the loss function the visual system deploys in a given situation is poorly understood. In empirical research 
the function in question is sometimes calculated by assuming the system has integrated information in a Bayes 
optimal fashion, and then inferring the relevant cost function from observed behavior, an approach which has invited 
criticism on the grounds that it insulates the claim that cognitive or perceptual systems are best modeled in Bayesian 
terms from disconfirmation, since the inferred loss function will disguise any discrepancy (Bowers and Davis 2012, 
Pouget et al. 2013). For helpful discussion of the role of loss-functions in Bayesian models of perceptual processing 
see Maloney 2001, (especially 171 ff.), Rescorla 2015, 697 ff. 
Figure 1: three convex dimples and one concave 
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We see the image as portraying one convex dimple that protrudes towards us from the page, and three 
concave dimples that recede away from us. However, if we rotate the image 180 degrees, then we have 




The marks on the page that portray the dimples are the same. Whether the dimple appears convex or 
concave just depends on which way up the page is.  The image is, to some extent, ambiguous: we cannot 
resolve the depth of the dimples without drawing on information about the direction of light. That 
information may not be contained in the sensory stimulus itself.  Only when we assign a value to that 
variable can we calculate the posterior distribution, from which the loss function selects a value that can 
serve as the determinate percept of depth. The visual system relies on a prior that light comes from above 
(and slightly to the left (Stone et al 2009)). When the image is rotated, we hold fixed that assumption. As 
a result, the dimples that looked convex, now look concave. 
Prior information is what makes visual perception possible. The visual system gathers and 
amends that information via processes of statistical learning from its environment. The importance of 
prior information to the process of visual perception focuses our attention on the question of where these 
priors come from. What kinds of information features in them? Certain priors, including the light-from-
Figure 2: three concave dimples and one convex 
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above prior, appear to be, for the most part, innate. 12 A wide range of other priors, however, are 
modifiable in light of experience, and reflect a process of statistical learning, whereby the visual system 
stores regularities previously encountered in its environment and uses them to interpret and parse new 
scenes.  
Visual statistical learning is a complex and multifaceted process involving a raft of different 
mechanisms that allow the visual system to encode a range of regularities, from the co-occurrence of low-
level features such as shape and color, to semantically coherent associations between objects and 
contexts. Visual statistical learning also helps us to overcome the excess of information available from the 
visual system, by guiding where we look and how attention is directed within a scene, letting us 
effectively exclude less relevant information in preference to attending to more contextually relevant 
stimuli. 
Visual statistical learning allows experience to modify visual priors in light of information about 
a particular recurring stimulus or context. This has significant upshots: individuals with different 
experiences can end up with different priors. That in turn means that they may have different visual 
experiences when confronted with the same stimulus. 
Take the example of motion perception. When we see a moving object, the sensory signals 
received by the eye are often highly ambiguous between different speeds of motion. The visual system 
draws on a range of stored information about context, lighting, and the probable velocity of different 
objects to calculate the probability that the object is moving at a given speed (Grossberg and Mingola 
1994). 
Chalk et al. (2010) investigated whether motion perception could be influenced by fast statistical 
learning. Did perceptual exposure to motion bias subjects’ perception of future stimuli? They found that 
expectations learned over the course of a single experiment were sufficient not only to alter perception of 
motion but to induce visual hallucinations in the absence of a stimulus.  																																																								
12 There is some limited evidence suggesting that even the light from above prior, long thought to be innate, can be 
modified to some small degree only on the basis of prior exposure. See Adams et al. (2014) Morgensten et al. 
(2011).  
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Chalk’s study is an artificial experimental isolation of an effect that occurs very widely. You 
associate particular colors with particular shapes, or particular contexts with particular stimuli, or 
particular objects with particular locations all on the basis of past exposure. Although the psychological 
literature describes the visual system’s knowledge of these regularities as “associations”, they are 
frequently grounded in a proportionate sensitivity to statistical regularities, frequently involving the 
extraction of conditional probabilities from previously encountered stimuli (Chun and Turk-Browne 
2008).13 Much empirical work remains to be done to establish how the visual system determines the limits 
of the context within which it learns and applies a particular prior, but the important point for our 
purposes is that it does seem to quickly learn from its environment and to apply that learning to the 
interpretation of incoming retinal data.  
Moreover, the kind of priors drawn on by the visual system encode not just basic low level visual 
information such as the direction of light, for instance, but more complex schematic expectations about 
the likelihood of encountering a given object for instance in a given scene. Experimental work 
investigating the source and nature of the priors drawn on by the visual system tends to focus on more 
easily measurable low-level expectations and effects. But constructivist models of perception also draw 
on prior probabilities acquired through statistical learning to explain more complex effects, for instance, 
our capacity to quickly and accurately identify objects when presented in the context of an appropriate 
scene.  
Recognizing objects is a challenging task which we struggle to model with computer algorithms 
(Poggio and Ullman 2013). Oliva and Torralba (2007) suggest that the human visual system accomplishes 
this task by drawing on stored information about the context in which an object is presented. This 
explains the widespread finding that objects appearing in a consistent background context are detected 
more accurately and quickly that those appearing in an inconsistent scene. More generally, context 																																																								
13 I note this usage since “associationist” learning is sometimes used in the cognitive science literature more broadly 
to indicate learning that may not conform statistically to the frequency of previous encounters, and that does not 
operate over propositional contents or result in graded states of knowledge or confidence over competing hypotheses 
(Kruschke 2008, Mandelbaum 2016). Similarly, “associative” structures or mechanisms frequently indicate 
specifically non-propositional forms of information storage (Mandelbaum 2016).  
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provides a robust estimate of the probability of an object’s presence, its position, and its scale relative to 
other objects (Oliva and Torralba 2007). Note that the notion of ‘context’ in play in this work is a fairly 
rich one: priming with an image of a kitchen counter improved people’s performance when it came to 
recognizing a loaf of bread rather than a drum (Palmer 1975, Davenport and Potter 2004). Contextual 
expectations draw on complex webs of associations in ways that have significant visual effects.14  
In recognizing the presence of these effects we need take no stand on the question of whether 
visual perception is cognitively penetrated, in the sense of whether an early visual module is subject to 
top-down influence from cognitive states such as beliefs and desires. 15 Much statistical learning is posited 
to take place within the visual system. Equally, non-visual information may influence the inputs and 
outputs to an early visual module without contravening the purported informational encapsulation of the 
visual system. 
Take a set of effects that uncontroversially do not operate on early vision per se: effects on the 
direction of attention. The direction of attention is a powerful means by which the visual system is able to 
prioritize the processing of certain inputs, devoting greater cognitive resources to certain objects, 
locations or features than others. The deployment of attention determines the nature of the visual input we 
receive and is clearly sensitive to prior information and expectations. Torralba et al (2006) offer a 
Bayesian model of how context guides attention. They suggest that very early on in the visual process, 
information about context is drawn on to reduce the number of locations considered by object-driven 
attentional mechanisms. Put simply, when you know where to expect the object you’re looking for, you 
have to look around less.  
The clearest examples of attentional effects demonstrate another important aspect of prior-driven 
effects on visual experience: they can be dramatic. Instances of attentional blindness involve subjects who 																																																								
14 See too Brady and Oliva 2008, for work suggesting that visual statistical learning mechanisms operate at a 
categorical level, and use existing conceptual knowledge. 
15 This definition of cognitive penetrability comes from Pylyshyn (1999). Pylyshyn argues that “an important part of 
visual perception, corresponding to what some people have called early vision, is prohibited from accessing relevant 
expectations, knowledge, and utilities in determining the function it computes – in other words, it is cognitively 
impenetrable” (341).  
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fail to notice discrepant objects in their visual fields. Recent work by Ward and Scholl (2015) suggests 
these effects are genuinely perceptual rather than merely a shortcoming in memory: subjects fail to see the 
stimulus in question, they do not simply fail to remember it.  
In perhaps the most famous example of this effect, participants counting the number of passes in 
a simple basketball game failed to notice a gorilla move across the court (Chabris and Simons 2010). 
More recent work has used eye-tracking to confirm that subjects are looking at the relevant area where the 
unexpected stimulus occurs for significant periods of time. Drew, Vo and Wolfe (2013) gave images of 
lungs to radiologists trained at detecting lung nodules. Some slides contained an image of a gorilla located 
directly besides a lung nodule. Though experts at detecting such nodules performed better than novices, 
83% still failed to detect the gorilla, despite directing their gaze directly at it. The input was available but 
was not processed. This demonstrates how attention determines which stimuli are taken up for processing 
on the basis of prior expectations, with the result that highly unexpected stimuli are overlooked. Again, 
that seems like a rational effect: holding fixed visual and cognitive resources, a radiologist who prioritized 
the search for possible images of animals in a lung would miss many more relevant signs of nodules.  
More generally, context primes the identification of certain objects more readily than others 
because we are far more likely to encounter those objects in those contexts. By allowing for the efficient 
direction of attention towards locations likely to contain relevant objects, reliance on context-driven priors 
can help us more efficiently locate and select salient stimuli.  
This sort of effect might seem at odds with another way of understanding the optimal design of a 
perceptual system, according to which it does its job best when it is neutral in its expectations, assigning 
equal probability to a surprising stimulus as an expected one. Jerry Fodor articulates this view when he 
writes in The Modularity of Mind, “the point of perception is, surely, that it lets us find out how the world 
is even when the world is some way that we don’t expect it to be” (1983: 69). It is true that excessive 
reliance on prior expectations would reduce the sensitivity of the visual system to retinal input and render 
its representations less accurate. But proper sensitivity to priors can help maximize rather than minimize 
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accurate representation. Recall the discrepancy between the available retinal input and our processing 
abilities. The alternative is not to see everything but to see less, less accurately, or more slowly. Given the 
inevitability of compromise in light of our cognitive and perceptual limitations, the use of stored 
information of the kind constructivist theories describe and predict seems epistemically legitimate. 
Three crucial features emerge from this brief review of the role of priors in constructivist models 
of perception. Firstly, those priors determine what individuals end up seeing. Whether a dot looks convex 
or concave depends on the prior probability of lighting coming from above or below. Whether or not you 
notice the gorilla in the lung depends on how you have directed your attention, even as you hold your 
gaze fixed. Secondly, priors are subject to modification and learning. That means that individuals with 
different experiences will end up with different priors. That in turn means that they may have different 
visual experiences when confronted with the same stimulus: if you’ve been subject to a different training 
regime, you may see an object as moving faster than I do. And finally, the kind of priors drawn on by the 
visual system appear to encode not just basic low level visual information such as the direction of light, 
for instance, but more complex schematic expectations about the likelihood of encountering a given 
object in a given scene.  
Taken together, these three features open up the following possibility: what we end up seeing 
depends in a non-trivial way on past experiences or conceptual schema at a level that leaves the visual 
system vulnerable to a kind of visual prejudice. These prejudicial experiences can then provide apparently 
rational support for prejudicial belief. The result is prejudicial beliefs in which it is extremely difficult to 
identify an epistemic flaw. In the next section I lay out a case for this claim.  
2. Visual Prejudice 
One way in which our interpretive priors may be revealed to us is through the occurrence of 
perceptual illusions. Consider the “turning tables” illusion below, devised by Roger Shepard. 
 
 




The quadrangles that represent the table-tops are in fact the same size and shape (yes, really,) but our 
priors that allow us to accurately perceive depth in 3D objects result in a visual experience that supports 
the belief that the quadrangle on the left is longer and thinner than that on the right. One explanation for 
the effect is that the visual system assumes that the marks representing the tables are produced by a 3D 
rather than a 2D object, that is, that we are seeing actual tables, rather than a drawing of tables. On the 
basis of that assumption, we see one table as longer than the other, as it would be if these were not marks 
on a page but tables in a room. In effect, our use of stored information throws us off when we deploy it in 
a novel and in this case inappropriate context. We can’t update a prior designed for a 3D world quickly 
enough to accurately represent the 2D image.  
In some sense the resulting experience is flawed: it is, after all, inaccurate. But it still seems 
capable of offering a reasonable degree of justification for belief in its contents. After all, beliefs based 
upon such an experience are consistent with a range of epistemic norms. Take reliabilism. Process 
reliabilism about justification claims that the degree of justification a belief enjoys depends on the 
reliability of the process responsible for its formation (or its sustenance), where reliability is a measure of 
the proportion of beliefs the process produces which are true (Goldman 1979, Beebe 2004). The reliabilist 
Figure 3: Turning tables illusion from Banaji and Greenwald (2013) 	
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is poorly placed to explain why the resultant belief in the case of a visual illusion is unjustified, since any 
number of candidates for the relevant belief-forming process are for the most part highly reliable: most of 
the beliefs we form about the depth and shape of objects when looking at 2D images are accurate. Visual 
illusions are specifically designed to dupe an otherwise reliable process. In this case, the visual system 
was unlucky, not unreliable.  
Evidentialism is no better placed to critique the resulting belief. According to the evidentialist the 
epistemic status of a belief depends on the evidence the individual has for it. (Connee and Feldman 2004). 
In this case, the subject responds to her evidence in the form of a perceptual experience when she forms 
the belief that the table-tops are different sizes. She is thus conforming to evidentialist norms of 
sensitivity to the information at her disposal. And if we extend our evaluation to the subpersonal 
inferences performed by her visual system, then we find that they too are consistent with those norms. 
The visual system has integrated incoming retinal evidence with stored evidence about environmental 
regularities. Evidentialists view a subject as bound by the information available to her: she is obliged to 
accommodate it by updating her beliefs appropriately. An epistemic agent cannot responsibly discard 
information in the absence of a defeater.16 In this case, the visual system is responding appropriately to 
previously encountered information or “evidence” to calculate the likely size and shape of the 
quadrangles. Equally, the individual responds appropriately to her perceptual evidence when she forms 
the belief that one table is longer than the other. 
Moreover, this recourse to prior information represents the application of an ecologically valid 
strategy. Although on some occasions drawing on that prior means that the visual system goes astray, the 
majority of the time that prior helps it to accurately represent the world around it. As Mahzarin Banaji and 
Anthony Greenwald put it, “[c]ontrary to expectation, this error reflects not a weakness of adaptation but 
rather a triumph, for Shepard’s tabletops highlight the success of a visual system that has adapted 																																																								
16 Doing so would conflict with the requirement of total evidence, that when reasoning about the world we must do 
so in accordance with the totality of available evidence. As Carnap puts it, “in the application of inductive logic to a 
given knowledge situation, the total evidence available must be taken as a basis for determining the degree of 
confirmation” (1950:2011). See too Hempel (1965), Kelly (2008). 
 Page 17 of 42	
effectively to the combination of a two-dimensional retina inside the eye and a three-dimensional world 
outside” (2013:5). Part of that effective adaption is realized via our reliance on stored information: we 
know how tables are usually arranged in space. The visual system uses that knowledge to interpret the 
image in front of it. In the Turning Tables illusion, a rational and normally reliable strategy happens to 
deliver an inaccurate result.  
The reliance of the visual system on stored information raises the following prospect: certain 
kinds of beliefs or experiences we intuitively wish to recognize as biased could operate in the manner of 
visual illusions. In virtue of accurately encoding statistical regularities to do with race or gender in the 
environment, the visual system could give rise to visual experiences that appear to ground biased or 
prejudiced beliefs. Like visual illusions, these experiences can arise from mechanisms that generally help 
us accurately represent the world around us, but that produce errors in certain situations. We often think 
of biased beliefs as beliefs that are immune to evidence (Molden and Higgins 2005, Cooper 2007). What 
if, instead, we have visual experiences which support prejudiced beliefs because of the sensitivity of our 
perceptual system to information it has encountered, either because the available information is itself 
biased, or because it reflects an unjust status quo? 
This is a disturbing possibility.  It suggests that certain kinds of bias may spring from strategies 
which are consistent with a range of epistemic norms, and which, considered more widely, enjoy a high 
degree of ecological validity. It is natural to hope that perceptual experience could provide a corrective to 
flawed or biased belief, a means of capturing contrary evidence that allows us to reconsider our existing 
beliefs. But if visual perception, even when functioning properly, is subject to its own demographic 
biases, then it will struggle to play this role.  
I shall call experiences of this kind Technically Unimpeachable Prejudicial Experience or TUPEs 
for short. The experiences are technically unimpeachable because they are the result of visual processing 
that is without flaw in all structural respects. The individual and their visual system have responded to 
the available information in a manner consistent with tenets of rationality and reliability. In this way, 
 Page 18 of 42	
there are no obvious “technical” grounds on which the experiences can be criticized at either the person 
or subpersonal level.  These experiences are prejudicial in the sense that they purport to provide grounds 
for prejudiced belief about a particular demographic.  
What sort of information would the visual system need to be sensitive to in order to render it 
potentially capable of perpetuating prejudice? Constructivist models claim the visual system learns 
statistically from its environment. If the visual system were sensitive to the demographic categories that 
often ground prejudice, such as race and gender, then statistical learning could give rise to TUPEs.  
There is good reason to think that the visual system is sensitive to these categories. There is 
evidence for instance that the visual system shows facial adaption that is specific to particular races. 
Perceptual adaptation is a temporary aftereffect that occurs when short-term exposure to stimuli distorted 
along or concentrated within a particular axis results in perception of other samples as distorted in the 
opposite direction. For instance, after viewing faces with artificially enlarged eyes, images of undistorted 
faces appear, by contrast to have disproportionately small eyes (Leopold et al. 2001). Jacquet et al. 
(2008) found that adaption to artificially distorted Caucasian features did not transfer to viewing Asian 
faces, and vice versa. This suggests that different neural populations code for different races of face, 
supporting the perceptual equivalent of something like racial categories.  
There is, moreover, reason to think that these perceptual categories are capable of linking to at 
least some of the conceptual content more broadly associated with their cognitive counterparts. Consider 
work done by Jennifer Eberhardt. Eberhardt and her colleagues conducted a series of experiments 
investigating how race influences visual perception. Eberhardt (2004) proposes that conceptual 
associations (including conceptual associations with race) influence visual perception via the direction of 
attention. She suggests that conceptual associations “operate as visual tuning devices by determining the 
perceptual relevance of stimuli in the physical environment” (2004: 877). This process has upshots for 
what we end up actually seeing: the results bear out the paper’s prediction that “stimuli deemed relevant 
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should be detected at lower thresholds than stimuli deemed irrelevant. Likewise, attention should be 
directed toward relevant stimuli and away from irrelevant stimuli” (2004:877).  
Eberhardt talks in terms of “conceptual associations,” though she does not offer a more specific 
description of the underlying mechanism. One way of understanding these associations is as sets of prior 
expectations about the probability of encountering particular stimuli in particular contexts. When well-
tuned, these prior expectations alert subjects to the probability of encountering certain stimuli in a given 
environment by encoding regularities the subject has encountered in the past. Letting them guide the 
deployment of our attentional resources seems like a sensible economy to make: when all errors are 
equally costly, attending to highly unlikely or irrelevant stimuli is unlikely to make the best use of 
limited processing resources.17  
But Jennifer Eberhardt’s work explores a circumstance in which the influence of these kinds of 
expectations is intuitively highly problematic. Subjects who were unknowingly primed with black faces 
were quicker to detect degraded images of crime-relevant objects, such as guns. Primes of black or white 
faces were flashed up to subjects in the course of a preliminary task, but at a speed (30 ms) that they were 
unable to detect. Subjects were then asked to identify as quickly as they can an object in an image that 
becomes slightly less degraded (as static noise reduced) frame by frame.  Some images contain crime-
relevant objects such as weapons and some contain crime-irrelevant objects such as guns or watches. 
Primed with black faces, subjects detected crime-relevant objects on average four frames sooner (19 
frames) than crime-irrelevant objects (23 frames), and four frames sooner than when not primed at all 
(Eberhardt 2004). 
This effect rendered subjects more sensitive: they were more likely to detect an object as a result 
of the prime. Should we consider these effects an epistemic good in that case? On the contrary, the greater 
readiness to identify crime-relevant objects after priming with black male faces seems like an intuitively 
																																																								
17	Of course, it may be the case that the costs of various errors are not all equal. Some stimuli may be unexpected but 
dangerous, making them costly to miss. In such a situation the visual system could adopt a cost function that 
prioritizes those possibilities in spite of the low posterior probability assigned to them.  
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problematic failure of neutrality on the part of the visual system.18  It seems epistemically preferable that 
the likelihood that you have a visual experience of a gun when presented with a given stimulus is 
unaffected by the race of the face with which you have been primed.  
Further evidence that the visual system is sensitive to racial categories comes from evidence of 
racial bias in the “first-person shooter task” investigated by Joshua Correll and his colleagues over a 
number of years.19 The task involves a videogame in which experimental subjects must shoot armed 
targets and not shoot unarmed targets. Targets are presented statically and subjects have only a short time 
in which to respond.20 Half the targets are white and half are black. Correll et al. (2007a, 2007b) found 
evidence of racial bias in subjects’ responses: they were quicker and more likely to shoot black targets. 
Correll et al. (2015) offers further evidence in favor of thinking this is an effect at the level of perception, 
not just response. On the grounds of a novel analysis of the 2007 data, Correll et al. (2015) suggest that 
																																																								
18 Is increased sensitivity of any kind following exposure to faces of a particular race epistemically inappropriate? 
There is ample evidence that we develop a kind of perceptual expertise with the faces to which we are most 
frequently exposed: we are more accurate at recognizing own-race and dominant-race faces than other-race or 
minority-race faces, with both fewer false positives and negatives, (Meissner and Brigham 2001). This “perceptual 
narrowing” develops in the first 9 months of life (Kelly et al. 2007). Subjects’ identification of emotion is also more 
accurate for same-race faces (Elfenbeim and Ambady 2002). Valentine (1991, Valentine et al. 2016) offers an 
interpretation of this “same-race face effect” in terms of a multi-dimensional “face space”, within which perceivers 
encode faces as points. Expertise with certain types of faces enlarges certain areas of the face-space allowing for 
finer-grained distinctions. This body of research gives rise to two particularly pertinent questions: is the 
development of an own-race face-expertise at the cost of other-race expertise an ecologically rational and 
epistemically advantageous pay-off to make? And would there would be anything epistemically pernicious about 
this enhanced sensitivity to faces of our own race even if it left our skill at reading other faces untouched? 
19 See too Keith Payne’s related work on subject’s greater readiness to identify a gun when primed with a black face 
than with a white face in a speeded decision task (Payne 2001). Note though that whilst Payne (2001) found that 
subjects made errors in 29% of trials when forced to respond under time pressure (and were more likely to falsely 
identify a tool as a gun when primed with a Black face compared with a White face), Payne et al. (2005) found that 
subjective confidence after a similar speeded identification task was extremely well calibrated to accuracy, with 
participants virtually never believing their own mistakes. Payne et al. interpret this as evidence that errors such as 
those demonstrated in the 2001 study were due to a ‘failure to control responses’ rather than a perceptual effect. 
Correll et al. (2015) partly sets out to investigate the apparent tension between Payne et al’s (2005) explication of 
these results as at the level of response rather than perception, and Eberhardt’s analysis suggesting a genuinely 
perceptual impact. Using a diffusion analysis of his own existing (2007) results, and a new experimental paradigm 
that gave subjects a brief exposure to stimulus but the opportunity to reconsider their responses at leisure, Correll 
concludes that whilst some errors are due to a control failure, that cannot fully account for racial bias in the first 
person shooter task, and that the response pattern “likely reflects a tendency to genuinely misperceive objects in a 
stereotype congruent fashion (2015:231).” He suggests the difference between Payne and Eberhardt’s results and 
analyses is due to Eberhardt, but not Payne, using a degraded stimulus. Eberhardt’s subjects were in effect 
compelled to supplement the limited available sensory information with stereotypical associations whilst Payne’s 
were not.  
20 730ms in Correll et al. 2007a, 630ms in Correll et al. 2007b. 
 Page 21 of 42	
stereotypes (in this case linking black men and crime) are drawn on to supplement the shortfall in 
information available from the visual system when the subject must make a decision under time pressure.  
This sensitivity to demographic categories, and thereby to previously encountered regularities in 
which they feature, gives rise to the possibility that our visual system prejudges certain situations, 
resolving ambiguous sensory stimulation in line with previously encountered regularities. In doing so, it 
risks perpetuating prejudice, by providing further grounds for the association between black men and 
crime, for instance. And yet, this process may happen in accord with a range of epistemic norms for both 
visual processing and for belief formation. This raises the following problem: what, if anything, is wrong 
with TUPEs? Is there reason to think that beliefs based upon them are unjustified?21   
 
To sharpen the problem at hand, consider the following two cases.  
 
a. Mairi is looking at a dog running in the distance. The retinal input she receives is consistent with 
a small dog slightly closer, moving at one speed or a larger dog, slightly further away, moving 
more quickly. On the basis of previous exposure to dogs, Mairi’s visual system resolves the 
ambiguity in favor of the latter experience, and she forms a belief that the dog is larger, slightly 
further away, and moving at a slightly faster speed. In fact, this dog is unusually small and her 
belief is inaccurate. 
 
b. Grace works as a coder in the United States. Fewer than 5% of coders are black. Her visual 
system relies on a prior that reflects that fact. Grace quickly scans a room of coders. The room is 
																																																								
21 In the cases I consider below, the information the visual system draws on is accurate. There is a closely related set 
of problem cases in which the information is not accurate but is provided by a normally reliable source. In these 
cases the individual is not unreasonable in drawing upon it, just as they casually rely upon many other similar pieces 
of information. Susanna Siegel in chapter 10 of her (2017) discusses cases in which the resultant beliefs are 
prejudiced, but “culturally normal” and hence have epistemic credentials that parallel many other unproblematic 
beliefs. Siegel handles these cases in terms of a kind of testimony from the world to the individual who holds the 
relevant belief. She then identifies the flaw in the individual’s belief in terms of his inheritance of epistemically ill-
founded presumptions in “the mind of the world”.  
 Page 22 of 42	
poorly lit, chiefly with blue light from computer screens. Her visual system resolves ambiguous 
information about the faces in the room so that she has a visual experience in which she sees the 
African American present as “whiter” than he in fact is. On the basis of her experience she forms 
the belief that all the coders present are white. That visual experience contributes to the support 
Grace thinks she enjoys for her belief that there are very few black coders.22  
 
In both cases, our agents form mistaken beliefs on the basis of a visual experience. In both cases the error 
cannot straightforwardly be attributed to an error on the part of either the individual or their perceptual 
system: the visual system has by hypothesis conditionalized appropriately on the available information, 
and the individuals have done nothing obviously blameworthy. But nonetheless these cases elicit differing 
sentiments: the belief Grace forms elicits an unease that does not arise in the case of Mairi. Both the 
perceptual experiences are technically unimpeachable, but only the latter seems liable to perpetuate 
prejudicial belief or behavior, rendering it a TUPE.  
The use of prior statistical information in Mairi’s case seems unproblematic: the use of priors 
facilitates her arrival at an interpretation of the external world which is highly likely to be accurate. She 
just happens to be unlucky: this time she’s looking at an unusual instance of a dog. The role of priors in 
forming Grace’s beliefs is structurally exactly similar. Yet her use of prior statistical information is likely 
to strike us as intuitively problematic. But on what grounds?  
The conundrum we face is this: the information that grounds Grace’s priors is not biased. There is 
no other evidence she could gather which would give her visual system a more accurate picture of the 
racial balance amongst coders. That her visual system uses a piece of accurate information to interpret 
																																																								
22 The case of Grace gives rise to a further set of interesting questions in light of the fact that there is information in 
the scene she surveys that she fails to uptake in her quick glance around the room. This feature of her experience 
again fails to distinguish it from many others: given the overwhelming quantity of information available in any 
scene, perceptual attention is a necessarily selective process (Carrasco 2011). This raises a set of interesting 
questions around the epistemic norms for the selection and deselection of information.  See Siegel (2013) for 
discussion of these issues and an argument that even content that is de-selected for uptake can influence the rational 
role of the resulting experience. See Marchi (2016) for an argument that attentional selection effects should be 
understood as a form of metacognitive regulation, and akin to a form of cognitive penetration.  
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ambiguous information whilst scanning a poorly-lit scene would be a legitimate thing to do in many other 
situations. In these circumstances however, relying on this environmental regularity generates a visual 
experience that seems liable to support and contribute to potentially racist attitudes. Grace fails to see that 
there is a non-white coder. She is consequently insulated from evidence that would counteract the 
generalization that black people don’t code.  
The way in which her prior has the result of insulating her from that counterevidence mimics 
classic cases of ideologically driven racist belief, in which ideology, rather than interpretive base rates, 
insulate an individual from taking up counterevidence to the beliefs they hold. Yet Grace’s belief is no 
more insulated than many others: no structural error distinguishes this visual experience from Mairi’s 
visual experience of the dog. What, if anything, distinguishes the two cases? Is the case of Grace marked 
out purely by the ethical concerns that TUPEs give rise to in light of their capacity of to encourage 
prejudicial belief and action, or is there in addition an epistemic flaw with Grace’s belief that does not 
arise in Mairi’s case?  
If the prior environmental regularities that underlie TUPEs, like the conceptual associations 
Eberhardt discusses, act as “visual tuning devices”, then racist conceptual associations may result in a 
visual system that is ‘tuned’ in such a way that the experiences it generates are subject to a kind of visual 
racial prejudice. These experiences can then provide an apparently rational grounding for prejudicial 
belief. The question we face is whether we have any grounds to identify that as the mere appearance of 
rationality? After all, these experiences are structurally indistinguishable from many other experiences 
that are intuitively unobjectionable and conform to a range of epistemic norms. And they seem to 
represent the application of an ecologically valid strategy. Are we compelled then to accept that 
prejudicial beliefs based upon them are in fact rational?  
Perhaps our unease springs from the “downstream” problems these beliefs contribute to, by 
encouraging discriminatory behavior, or by functioning as a kind of self-fulfilling prophecy, encouraging 
morally problematic behavior that in turn shores up the future accuracy of these statistics. Or 
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alternatively, perhaps our discomfort around these perceptual experiences is due simply to moral qualms, 
about the cost of taking certain actions on the basis of the resulting beliefs.   
Our sentiments around TUPEs may reflect a range of moral concerns. But that need not compel 
us to dismiss our sense of unease around them as the mere dazzle of the moral preventing us from 
confronting unwelcome “hard truths” about the rationality of prejudicial beliefs.23 There is no barrier to 
these moral concerns coexisting with a range of epistemic flaws.  
In identifying an epistemic flaw with TUPES, we face the following challenge. Cases of TUPEs 
are distinguished by non-epistemic features, by the demographic properties that feature in them: in other 
respects they arise from standard cognitive and visual processes. More specifically still, these cases share 
a potential ethical valence – the worry is that these experiences can perpetuate prejudice or injustice. 
 To offer a characterization of the flaw that arises in these cases in epistemic terms we need to 
explain why those distinguishing ethical features should give rise to a distinctively epistemic problem. 
Moreover, since the individual and her visual system are ex hypothesi faultless, we must locate the roots 
of the flaw outside of her, and her response to information. I propose that we locate the roots of the flaw 
instead in the social structure within which the individual is located. In the next section I turn to this 
positive account.24 	
																																																								
23 Lee Jussim, for instance, suggests that moral qualms or political sympathies are behind the reluctance of social 
psychologists to embrace evidence of the accuracy of stereotypes: “Why do so many psychologists emphasize 
stereotype inaccuracy when the evidence so clearly provides evidence of such high accuracy?  Why is there this 
Extraordinary Scientific Delusion? There may be many explanations, but one that fits well is the leftward lean of 
most psychologists.  If we can self-righteously rail against other people's inaccurate stereotypes, we cast ourselves as 
good, decent egalitarians fighting the good fight, siding with the oppressed against their oppressors” (Jussim 2012). 
24 Could this flaw be captured in terms of a fault in the loss function required by probabilistic models of visual 
processing, described in section one above? That loss function determines what part of the probability function will 
be selected as a determinate percept, depending on the relative costs of different possible errors. It is potentially 
sensitive to a wide range of features of a subject’s context and goals. One moral we could extract from these cases is 
that that selection process should be sensitive to the costs of reflecting environmental regularities that encode 
demographic information.  
Suppose the visual system incorporates prior and incoming information to arrive at a probability 
distribution over possible races that the face in question might be. What costs should it be sensitive to in selecting 
some part of those various distributions as the relevant percept? The discussion so far has by and large crudely 
assumed that the relevant cost function merely plumps for the maximum a-posteriori probability. And yet the role of 
the loss function is precisely to introduce a more complex sensitivity to contextual factors and task-relevant 
constraints. Why not allow that the loss function could introduce the sensitivity our intuitions apparently demand to 
demographic features? After all, sensitivity to those features carries particular and distinct costs. It could be, for 
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3. Social injustice and perceptual skill 
 
In this section I put forward a positive argument that Grace’s visual state inherits an epistemic flaw from 
the prior it is based on. I focus on the case of Grace, but the argument generalizes straightforwardly to 
TUPEs more broadly. I argue that TUPEs manifest a deficit in perceptual skill, and that any diminution in 
perceptual skill is properly regarded as an epistemic flaw. That impairment in perceptual skill is the result 
of features of the social structure within which Grace is located, but it manifests in Grace as an individual 
by making her less perceptually skilled. Identifying this epistemic flaw allows for a resolution of the 
conundrum of apparently rational prejudicial belief. 
The overarching argument is as follows:  
P1. To be skilled at seeing is to be disposed to form knowledge states appropriate for guiding 
instances of seeing 
P2. Grace’s prior is not appropriate for guiding seeing.  
P3. As a result of drawing on that prior, Grace is less perceptually skilled  
P4. A reduction in perceptual skill is an epistemic flaw  
C Grace’s visual experience is epistemically flawed.  
I shall devote the most attention to arguing for P2. P3 follows from P1 and P2, and P4 is closely 
related to P1. I start then by unpacking P1, and the claim that visual perception can be treated as a skill. 																																																																																																																																																																																		
instance, that sensitivity to race in face perception carries with it certain costs by encouraging in-group biases in just 
the way that the Grace’s case seems to. The cases could then be distinguished because the cost function deployed in 
Mairi’s case is optimal whereas that in Grace’s case is not. 
Cashing this out in terms of cost function faces the following difficulty: such functions are often assumed 
to be sensitive to distinctively ecological costs. It is possible that those costs include, or could be augmented by, the 
gains and losses of coherent social relations between different racial groups. However, it is also possible that such 
costs would in some cases push against the intuitively right results. For instance, it could be argued that there are be 
high ecological costs to failing to respond suspiciously to out group members, particularly in the kind of crime-
relevant contexts explored by Eberhardt and Correll. Moreover, the loss function in play will need to be context 
sensitive in complex ways: though in this case there may be costs associated with “whitewashing” the room, in other 
situations there could be costs associated with erring in the other direction.  
Plausibly, an adequate account of this sort will have to take into consideration more than merely ecological 
costs. The question then arises: how must the visual system weight costs to produce the intuitively right results? Are 
these costs ethical in nature? Or are they epistemic? This is, in effect the question I take up in the next section, 
though I do not do so in terms of a loss function. But what I say could be viewed as offering a description of some of 
the features to which a loss function would need to be sensitive for it to provide the right tool to identify a flaw in 
these cases.  
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I draw my analysis of skill in P1 from the account of skill put forward in Stanley and Williamson 
(2016). Stanley and Williamson analyze skill as “a kind of disposition to know.” More precisely, Stanley 
and Williamson propose the following analysis:  
To be skilled at the action type of f-ing is to be disposed to form knowledge appropriate for 
guiding tokens of f-ing (2016: 6). 
I am applying this analysis of skill to the case of perception. Whilst psychologists frequently talk of 
perceptual skills, the term “skill” is philosophically freighted in a way that may cause us to hesitate before 
applying it to perceptual abilities. After all, isn’t a skill an activity that is within our control, in a way that 
perception seems not to be?  
Although we have less control over our perceptual abilities than we do other activities 
conventionally described as skills, it is nonetheless appropriate to regard perception as a skill in Stanley 
and Williamson’s sense. Perception is an activity that is guided by knowledge states. This is true at 
multiple levels. On the one hand an individual draws on knowledge states at a person-level to guide their 
seeing, as they figure out where and how to look, how to shield their eyes from the sun, or how to 
effectively focus on an object in the distance. But an upshot of the constructivist models described above 
is that visual perception also relies on knowledge states at a sub-personal level, in the form of priors 
drawn on by the visual system, in light of which it interprets retinal data. These priors contain knowledge 
about the seer’s context, the probability of encountering certain stimuli in that context, the likely shape 
and size of those stimuli, as well as the balance of light and shade, and luminance and contrast, which 
allow the visual system to build up a picture of the external world. In this way, the knowledge states 
appropriate for guiding seeing are not limited to knowledge about seeing but including knowledge about 
the world – the objects in it and their associated properties - which allows us to process retinal input 
appropriately.  
When we apply Stanley and Williamson’s analysis to visual perception, we arrive at the claim 
that to be skilled at seeing is to be disposed to form knowledge states appropriate for guiding instances of 
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seeing. We can regard the prior information that guides the interpretation of retinal information by Grace 
as knowledge states that guide her visual perception.25  
Stanley and Williamson’s analysis prepares the ground for P4: any deficit in skill is thereby an 
epistemic deficit, because it is a knowledge deficit. But importantly, a deficit in perceptual skill is an 
epistemic deficit twice over: both the knowledge states that guide the activity, and the beliefs to which the 
activity gives rise are flawed. 
Stanley and Williamson’s analysis employs the ambiguous term “appropriate”. The word can be 
freighted with a range of norms, including norms that arise from social convention (appropriate attire, for 
instance) and ethical norms (appropriate care when driving). Its use in relation to skill is intended both in 
Stanley and Williamson’s (2016) and here to be understood neutrally. Any normative content is inherited 
from the nature of the particular activity in question: a knowledge state is appropriate for guiding an 
activity purely if it facilitates the proper performance of that activity. A skilled murderer has knowledge 
states appropriate for guiding the action of murder, though his skilled action may be both unconventional 
and immoral.26 So knowledge states appropriate for seeing are simply those knowledge states that make a 
seer better able to perceive his environment. This focuses our attention on P2 and the following question: 
why are Grace’s priors not appropriate for guiding seeing? In virtue of what are they defective? 
To answer this question we have to first ask what it is we want from visual perception. Only 
relative to that can we decide what constitutes skilled perception. We can recognize competing goals: on 
the one hand, we want to accurately perceive our local environment. On the other hand, we want to retain 
the capacity to perceive a range of ways our environment could be but isn’t: we value flexibility in our 
perceptual capacities, the ability to perceive novel, unexpected stimuli as well as regularities in the actual 
environment. These two abilities can pull in different directions: priors that adapt to regularities in the 
local environment optimize accurate perception within it, but that adaptation can come at the price of 
accurate perception of the global environment: the broader set of contexts in which the individual may 																																																								
25 I assume that subpersonal knowledge states of this kind do not entail (person-level) belief.  
26 I am grateful to Timothy Williamson for this particular illustration.  
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operate in the future, or which retain relevance for her even within her local environment. Supposing we 
want a balance between these two goals, priors that bring local adaptation at the cost of global flexibility 
can be inappropriate for guiding seeing. I argue that Grace’s prior is of just that kind.   
Grace’s prior is gerrymandered. A prior is gerrymandered if its accuracy is covertly dependent on 
the on-going manipulation of the subject’s environment. The prior constitutes an adaptation to a localized 
regularity, one that relies on a previous intervention. As a result, gerrymandered priors make it hard for 
the visual system to balance both local specialization and general flexibility. In certain cases, cases in 
which the broader context retains relevance for the subject, that diminishes her perceptual skill.  
Gerrymandering of a prior occurs via the on-going manipulation of the environment. That 
manipulation can occur in various ways, most obviously via the direct manipulation of the sample on 
which the prior is based. Suppose I raise a child and I paint all the bananas he encounters pink. Over time 
he acquires a perceptual prior that objects shaped like bananas are likely to be pink. That prior is 
gerrymandered: whilst it accurately reflects the stimuli he has encountered, it is based on a sample of 
bananas that have been subject to a particular intervention. Note that the accuracy of the prior depends on 
that manipulation continuing: if I stop painting the bananas pink, the child’s prior will quickly become 
inaccurate. This importantly distinguishes gerrymandering of a prior from the shaping of a sample set 
merely by manipulation that has occurred in the past. If I genetically modify the bananas to be pink, the 
child’s prior is not gerrymandered, at least not in the sense I am interested in, because the prior will 
continue to be accurate in the absence of any further intervention on my part. Gerrymandered priors are 
liable to revert. If I am really ambitious, I could arrange for all the bananas in the world, now and for the 
foreseeable future, to be painted pink. But the prior my child acquires would still be gerrymandered: its 
accuracy still depends on my intervention. As a result of their dependency on an intervention of some 
kind, gerrymandered priors compel a discrepancy between the local environment to which the seer has 
adapted, and her global environment.  
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How does this apply to Grace? Why think that Grace’s prior has been gerrymandered? Grace’s 
prior represents the low probability that a coder would be black. That state of affairs too relies on a 
particular manipulation. In this case, it is the skewing of opportunity along racial lines in the US. In 
possible worlds with more just social structures, this disparity amongst coders would not hold.27 In 
Grace’s case, her priors about her environment are gerrymandered by unjust social structures. Unjust 
social structures affect which individuals become coders. The accuracy of Grace’s prior is dependent on 
that manipulation continuing. 
In this way, Grace’s case is relevantly different from Mairi’s. Though manipulation of dog breeds 
in the past plays some role in the prior Mairi has about dog size, the accuracy of her prior is not as closely 
dependent on an on-going manipulation as Grace’s prior. Dog breeding has manipulated the genetic 
profile of dogs in a way that prevents their simple reversion even in the absence of on-going dog breeding 
programs.28 That is distinct from the restrictions structural injustice places on disadvantaged groups which 
depend for the most part on the continued imposition of the restriction in question.  
This disjuncture between local and global contexts in cases of gerrymandering has  a number of 
epistemic upshots. Perhaps most obviously, gerrymandered priors can be unsafe. As such, they will fail to 
constitute knowledge states, and will thereby be inappropriate for guiding seeing. We could put this 
argument in the following form: 
P5. A perceptual prior is gerrymandered if its accuracy is covertly dependent on the on-going 
manipulation of the subject’s environment.  
P6. Gerrymandered priors may be unsafe in virtue of their dependence on an on-going 
manipulation. 
																																																								
27This is of course a substantive claim in its own right, though one I take to be highly plausible. Readers who 
disagree with it will likely disagree with the claim that there is any problem with Grace’s visual experience. I invite 
them to construct their own example of a statistical fact that holds only in virtue of certain unjust social practices 
and to proceed from there.  
28 The criterion of reversion predicts a distinction between priors concerning aspects of the appearance of dogs that 
are the result of case-by-case intervention, (such as docking tails or cropping ears), and priors that concern features 
that have been bred to look a particular way and as a result would required a far longer time period if they were to 
revert, (for instance, dogs that are bred to have a short ‘bobtail’.) The former, but not the latter, are gerrymandered.   
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P7. In virtue of being unsafe, gerrymandered priors may fail to amount to knowledge.  
P8. Priors that do not amount to knowledge are not appropriate for guiding seeing.  
C. Gerrymandered priors may be inappropriate for guiding seeing.  
Gerrymandered priors are liable to be unsafe because the dependency of the prior’s accuracy on 
an on-going intervention makes it possible that there could be similar cases, in which the sustaining 
condition has held up to the present time, but in which it no longer holds, rendering the prior false (a case 
in which I tire of my project and stop painting bananas pink). There is thus a nearby world in which the 
subject has the prior, but the prior is inaccurate. In this way, dependency on an on-going manipulation 
renders the prior unsafe in a way that can be knowledge defeating (Williamson 2000). Skilled perception 
is guided by appropriate knowledge states. In cases in which gerrymandered priors fail to amount to 
knowledge, visual perception that is guided by them will fail to be skilled. This is the first way in which 
gerrymandered priors can be inappropriate for guiding seeing.  
This analysis accounts for certain flaws that can arise from gerrymandered priors. But it is not 
straightforwardly applicable to Grace’s case. Accepting that her prior is gerrymandered by structural 
injustice does not necessarily render it unsafe. Structural injustice appears, regrettably, to be a fairly 
secure state of affairs, one that is unlikely to fail to hold in any of Grace’s nearby worlds. Her prior is 
therefore safe, and capable of constituting a knowledge state.29 We have to ask, then, what other epistemic 
impacts gerrymandering can have. 
Priors encode information about samples encountered in the past, but they also constitute a kind 
of prediction, that the regularities found in that sample are projectable into the future, onto further 
instances of the kind. In this respect, priors have a modal aspect: they go beyond the actual sample 
encountered to predict what other instances of the kind will be like. Priors have a modal momentum. The 
																																																								
29 One way of assimilating the problem of TUPEs to a lack of safety would be to insist on a morally-valenced 
ordering of worlds, according to which morally better worlds are always closer than morally worse worlds. See 
Phillips et al. (2015) for some interesting evidence that we do in fact reason as though that were the case, that is to 
say, that morality influences our judgments about which possibilities are relevant alternatives in a given situation.  
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validity of that momentum depends on the match between local and global environments. By forcing a 
disconnect between them, gerrymandering gives rise to an inaccurate modal momentum.  
The key characteristic of gerrymandered priors is that their accuracy is contingent on a 
manipulation of some kind. That dependence is significant for our knowledge of our actual environment, 
and the objects in it. Take the case of the painted bananas: the child confronted only with pink bananas 
has a visual prior that associates bananas with the color pink. The extension of that association is 
constricted by my intervention. The prior’s insensitivity to that fact can constitute a significant loss of 
information. Why? Because a concept of banana that associates it only with pink is missing important 
information about the modal profile of bananas. The momentum of the prior and experiences based on it 
is towards inaccurate modal attitudes, that ground a firmer connection between a kind and a property than 
is warranted, given the role of gerrymandering in securing the regularity in question.  
Because of this, even when the prior in question is safe, gerrymandering leads to a loss of 
information about the broader environment. In a certain subset of cases this leads to a loss of information 
sufficiently relevant that it restricts the perceptual skill of an individual. Gerrymandering can obscure 
information about counterfactual features of a kind, in a way that allows the resulting visual experience to 
contribute momentum, in the form of apparent rational support, towards an inaccurate modal belief. 
Certain natural features of our environment have capacities or dispositions that are artificially restricted 
by manipulations such as social injustice. In these cases, gerrymandering is epistemically problematic.  
Gerrymandering becomes a problem at the point at which a visual experience supports not just a 
simple reflection of the experience in belief, that this is a pink banana I am looking at right now, but at the 
point at which visual experiences offer direct support for a broader network of conceptual associations, 
which ultimately contribute to more complex modal and general beliefs about kinds and their capacities. 
To the extent that gerrymandered priors encourage an inaccurate representation of modal facts, they are 
inappropriate for guiding seeing.  
We could present this argument thus:  
 Page 32 of 42	
P9. Skilled perception gives rise to knowledge of the subject’s local and global environment.  
P10. Visual experiences that result from gerrymandered priors lend support to inaccurate general 
or modal beliefs  
P11. Priors are not appropriate for guiding seeing if they are liable to systematically result in 
visual experiences that lend support to inaccurate beliefs, including inaccurate general or 
modal beliefs. 
P12. Grace’s perceptual prior has been gerrymandered 
C. Grace’s prior is not appropriate for guiding seeing.  
P9 articulates the plausible assumption that visual perception aims at knowledge of both the 
subject’s local environment, that is, the environment to which their priors have most immediately 
adapted, and their global environment, construed to include relevant counterfactual possibilities, and ways 
their environment could be. A prior is inappropriate for guiding seeing then if the visual (belief) states to 
which it lends support fail to amount to knowledge. One way in which they may fail to do so is if they are 
inaccurate. Visual experiences that encourage the formation of inaccurate beliefs, or accurate beliefs that 
fail to constitute knowledge for some other reason, are instances of less skilled perception: in this way, 
P11 follows from P9. Stanley and Williamson emphasize that skills are multi-dimensional: there are many 
ways of being better or worse at any one of them (2016:10). We need not treat knowledge acquisition as 
the sole aim of visual perception. I claim only that one way of being less skilled at seeing is that the belief 
states the visual system produces fail to constitute knowledge.30  
 P10 crucially focuses our attention on the question of what kind of belief states visual experience 
supports. Most simply, visual experiences purport to represent the world as it actually is. But we also rely 
on visual experiences for others purpose: they support our understanding of regularities in the world 
around us. This is the claim I make in P10. I claim, moreover, that they lend support to general or modal 
beliefs about the environment and its contents. This happens not just via inferences from visual 																																																								
30 One particular salient alternative function of perceptual skill is to facilitate effective action, rather than 
representation. See Ludwig (2006) for critical discussion of that claim. 
 Page 33 of 42	
experiences to beliefs, but through the experiences’ direct impact on implicit and explicit attitudes that 
may not be mediated by inference.31 
 Suppose a prior that bananas are pink contributes to my having a visual experience of a banana as 
pink. This visual state can contribute to a wide range of other mental states. Most simply, it can support a 
belief that the banana I am currently looking at is pink. But that simple, explicit perceptual belief is only 
the tip of the iceberg of the credal impact of the experience. The experience can additionally strengthen an 
association between bananas and certain color properties. In doing so it can directly shape the subject’s 
concept of banana. It can increase the likelihood the subject implicitly accords to the possibility that a 
banana is pink. Any of those states can then feed into inferences that combine visual experiences with 
other information about the way the world is to produce explicit beliefs about modality that could be 
roughly captured by sentences such as “Bananas tend to be pink”, “Bananas are pink because of x, y and 
z”, “Bananas are pink across such and such a set of contingencies”, “Bananas are pink sorts of things”.  
At the point at which explicit beliefs of this sort are formed, the individual can correct for the 
impact of gerrymandering in their visual experiences: when the child finds out about the banana painting 
project he may strongly discount his visual evidence as a guide to bananas more generally, and 
appropriately so. Alternatively, further rational flaws can arise at this point. But even before the subject 
engages in those inferential processes, his experience can directly influence his grasp of the generality of 
a particular association, and so too his implicit representation of kinds, their capacities and their 
commonly associated properties. The crucial point is this: visual experiences of the particular contribute 
to general representations of the objects that feature in them. They both causally contribute to such 
general representations, and they appear to offer some degree of prima facie rational support to them, in 
so far as they constitute a key method of data sampling on which such beliefs are based. The individual is 																																																								
31 Though it is often assumed that perception justifies only beliefs about the actual world, the claim that perception 
can both cause and directly justify modal beliefs is not new. Gibsonian affordances are one way in which perception 
has been claimed to support modal content, by providing information about the possibility of action in the 
environment (Gibson 1979; 1986). More recently Margot Strohminger (2015) has argued that perception can 
directly justify a range of modal beliefs, including beliefs such as “The house could have been yellow”, without that 
requiring that sensory experiences themselves need include modal content.  
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not bound to form the belief that is supported by their visual experience, frequently they will not. Though 
they may go on to form alternative ultima facie beliefs, we can identify the role of the prior and the 
resulting experience in supporting an association or concept that erroneously excludes information about 
capacities and dispositions. It provides a (stoppable) momentum towards certain modal beliefs, and other 
attitudes with implicit modal import.  
Gerrymandering of priors increases the cost of perceptual adaptation to the local environment. It 
provides a momentum towards inaccurate modal or general beliefs: extrapolating from the set of 
experiences supported by gerrymandered priors is a less good guide to dispositions or capacities of a kind 
outside of that local context than when a visual experience relies on priors that have not been 
gerrymandered. An optimal prior will be based on a sample that is not artificially restricted. Such a prior 
reflects as much information as possible about the dispositions and capacities of the kind. Few priors are 
comprehensive in this way, but gerrymandered priors are particularly problematic. The manipulation 
responsible for the gerrymandering limits the set to which the subject has been exposed in ad hoc ways. 
As a result, gerrymandering can restrict our access to relevant modal information, by making it the case 
that the individuals that constitute the sample set fail to manifest certain properties. In these cases, 
gerrymandered samples systematically misrepresent the class in question. Modal representations based on 
the resulting experiences can be misleading even if the relevant manipulation is likely to continue: 
unrealized dispositions are relevant to our accurate representation of categories in the actual world.  In 
this way the analysis does not rely on the fragility of the state of affairs on which the accuracy of the prior 
depends. It is the failure to represent the dependency itself that misleads, because it gives rise to 
inaccurate implications about the ways things could be, or naturally are, and about the capabilities of the 
groups involved. 
What about when the individual does represent in some form the contingency of the relevant 
regularity? For instance, what if Grace knows full well that the lack of black coders is due to structural 
injustice? In this situation, Grace’s other mental states can compensate for the limits on her perceptual 
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skill. The perceptual priors she has are not optimally appropriate for guiding seeing. But just as we might 
make up for our lack of skill at cooking by relying on a cookery book or our lack of skill at ice-skating by 
relying on the arm of a friend, so Grace can rely on additional non-perceptual beliefs to make up for the 
limitations on her perceptual skill.  
Gerrymandering of priors is epistemically problematic because it gives rise to a basic tension in 
our capacity to gather information about kinds as they present in our actual environment, and information 
about their counterfactual dispositions and capacities. On the one hand, gerrymandered priors encode 
information we need if we are, for the most part, to accurately perceive particular objects in our 
immediate surroundings. But on the other hand in failing to make explicit the manipulations that secure 
certain regularities they push us towards misrepresenting the modal profile of kinds in our environment. If 
all the bananas in your environment are pink, you will fair badly with a prior that they are likely to be 
yellow. On the other hand, a gerrymandered pink-banana prior is likely to contribute to visual experiences 
that provide a momentum towards inaccurate general or modal beliefs about bananas, because of its 
covert dependence on the manipulation of the set of bananas to which the subject has been exposed.  
Though you can correct explicit general or modal beliefs on the basis of additional non-visual 
information, the visual experience itself still contributes to a more limited representation of the kind in 
question.32 
The account given here invites the following objection, specific to Grace’s case: why see 
structural injustice as a manipulation, given how stable a feature of our society it appears to be? Why not 
treat is as a natural, even an essential feature of our environment? Here is the response: though some kind 
of injustice may appear to be a virtual inevitability, that the injustice takes this particular form, that these 
																																																								
32 Sally Haslanger’s (2012) analysis of why generics, even those that express accurate information cannot be 
permissibly asserted points to a related flaw. Haslanger writes that generics “…describe the world as if it is, by its 
nature, how we have interpreted it, and from there caused it, to be…. In purporting just to capture the facts, the 
generics import an explanation, implicate that the source of the truth of these claims lies in what cows, women and 
blacks, are” (2012: 468). Perception similarly presents us with information about the world without offering any 
commentary on how the world has come to be that way. The danger is a related one, that perceptual experience 
naturally supports beliefs that extrapolate from that presentation without representing the manipulation which 
secures the accuracy of the relevant priors. 
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individuals in particular are oppressed, is not. The state of affairs in which no one group is 
disproportionately represented in certain areas as a result of oppressive forces working against their full 
participation is legitimately regarded as a default, not because justice is the norm but because injustice 
against any one particular group is bound to be, from a modal perspective, improbable, relative to which 
structural injustice constitutes a manipulation capable of gerrymandering a prior. Moreover, structural 
injustice is more likely to gerrymander a prior in problematic ways than structurally just social systems 
because of the way in which it is particularly likely to constrict the opportunities of groups to manifest 
certain capacities: for instance, to occupy certain professions, acquire particular skills or to be more 
generally visible in certain domains.  
Thus particular ethical features of a seer’s context can have epistemic consequences because they 
constitute a form of gerrymandering, a means of manipulating the priors the visual system draws on in 
seeing the world. But this point is perfectly general. Any kind of gerrymandering will have this upshot. 
Often this is of little real consequence because the implicit modal representations supported by these 
experiences are embedded within networks of other, more sophisticated beliefs which explicitly represent 
the generality of regularities in the world around us, and the dependence of certain facts on particular 
forms of organization. 
This response leads to another worry, however, that the account over-predicts in the following 
manner: gerrymandering, the dependence of a prior’s accuracy on an on-going manipulation, is just one 
end of a spectrum of possible explanatory stories we can tell about the world around us. We live in 
complex social worlds in which many of the regularities we encounter are the result of “manipulation” of 
some kind or other. The shape of postboxes, or lamp-posts, or houses are all the result of human action. If 
all these interventions result in gerrymandered perceptual priors, then our account seems to now predict 
limitations on perceptual skill in many cases in which we intuitively detect no particular flaw. The flaw 
cannot stem from gerrymandering alone, nor from the failure of visual priors to represent the dependency 
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in question, since no visual prior can carry information about its explanatory history, and every prior has 
some history or other.  
To appreciate why the account does not over-generate as dramatically as this, note that the claim 
is not that gerrymandering per se is a flaw, but that it gives rise to a flaw in cases in which it obscures 
relevant modal information about a kind or class. This problem will arise only for a subset of 
gerrymandered priors. Street signs, and houses and toasters look as they do because of certain chains of 
action. But for the most part there are no deeper facts about the capacities of toasters and street signs that 
the individual is liable to miss as a result of this. The capacities and dispositions of toasters and street 
signs are constituted not restricted by our behavior. In this sense, they are created rather than 
manipulated. There is no corresponding loss of information as there is in the case in which structural 
injustice, by, for instance, restricting access to opportunities, constrains the ability of members of a class 
to manifest relevant capacities and dispositions. In the case of the painted bananas, there is another state 
to which bananas would revert if my intervention on them ceased. That is why the sample is not a good 
guide to the broader kind. This is not the case with lampposts or houses. As a result the individual’s prior 
does not provide the same momentum towards inaccurate modal beliefs in those cases. The account does 
predict a similar epistemic flaw when we see, for instance, only dogs with docked tails, or pruned trees, or 
damned rivers. In these cases, I am liable to form inaccurate beliefs about the height to which trees 
generally grow, or the kinds of tails dogs naturally have, or the ways in which rivers behave. That is why 
a prior based exclusively on pruned trees will be inappropriate for guiding seeing.33  
There may be cases in which our perceptual priors are the result of gerrymandering, but in which 
we do not intuitively feel the presence of an epistemic flaw. That may indicate only a lack of sensitivity in 
																																																								
33 On this account, the distinction between cases in which we fail to know something of importance about a kind and 
cases in which there is no such failure bottoms out not in a distinction between cases with and without ethical 
valence, but in facts about what information matters to us in learning about and navigating the world. That in turn 
may depend on (a) metaphysical facts about the objects in our environment and (b) facts about our practical and 
epistemic interests. See Cartwright (1989) for relevant defense of the importance of facts about capacities to 
scientific enquiry. 
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our epistemic intuitions. The moral valence of these cases helpfully sensitizes us to the presence of an 
epistemic flaw we might otherwise miss. That does not mean that the flaw itself is ethical.  
The point is not that there is something else Grace’s visual system could or should have done. 
Rather, it is that social structures limit perceptual skill in a way the individual can do little to combat. In 
contexts in which a prior depends on a particular intervention or manipulation of some kind there is 
nothing the visual system can do to get it right. Its function is to represent the world as it is, not as it 
should be. But in fulfilling that function, it supports not just particular beliefs but general beliefs about the 
world, and the range of ways it can be. When the world is the way it is only because of particular 
contingencies that distort and limit in some ways the objects and people we encounter, then the visual 
system cannot show us how the world is without potentially misleading us as to how the world can be.  
As a result, structural injustice gives rise to an epistemic loss, by rendering individuals less 
perceptually skilled. In structurally unjust societies, even if the visual system were to perform perfect 
statistical learning, the perceptual skills of individuals would still be capped. If they are to function 
properly, our perceptual capacities require social structures that do not artificially restrict the range of 
stimuli we encounter.  
Works Cited 
Adams, W.J., Graf, E.W. and Ernst, M.O. 2004. Experience can change the ‘light-from-above’ prior. Nature 
Neuroscience 7:1057-1058 
Balcetis, E. 2015. Approach and avoidance as organizing structures for motivated distance perception. Emotion 
Review, 9, 1096–1096. 
Beebe, J. 2004. The Generality Problem, Statistical Relevance and the Tri-Level Hypothesis. Noûs 38 (1):177 - 
195. 
Carnap, R. 1950. Logical Foundations of Probability. University of Chicago Press. Chicago, Illinois. 
Carrasco, M. 2011. Visual attention: The past 25 years. Visual Research 2011 51(13):1484-1525 
Carrasco, M. 2011.Visual attention: The past 25 years. Visual Research 2011 51(13):1484-1525 
Cartwright, N. (1989). Nature's Capacities and Their Measurement. Oxford University Press. 
Chabris, C. F., & Simons, D. J. 2010. The invisible gorilla: How our intuitions deceive us. New York: Random 
House. 
 Page 39 of 42	
Chalk, M. Seitz, A.R. and Series, P. 2010. Rapidly learned stimulus expectations alter perception of motion. 
Journal of Vision 108.2: 1-18 
Chun, M. and Wolfe, J. 2001. “Visual Attention” in E.B. Goldstein (ed.) Blackwell Handbook of Sensation and 
Perception. Blackwell. 
Connee, E. and Felmdan, R. 2004 Evidentialism: Essays in Epistemology. Oxford University Press 
Cooper, J. 2007. Cognitive dissonance: 50 years of a classic theory. Sage. 
Correll, J. Crawford, M.T., Wittenbrink, B. and Sadler, M.S. 2015. Stereotypic Vision: How Stereotypes 
Disambiguate Visual Stimuli. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. 108.2:219-233 
Correll, J., Park, B., Judd, C.M. Wittenbrink, B. Sadler, M and Keesee, T. 2007b. Across the Thin Blue Line: 
Police Officers and Racial Bias in the Decision to Shoot. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 
92.6 1006-1023 
Correll, J., Park, B., Judd, C.M., and Wittenbringk, B., 2007a. The influence of stereotypes on decision to shoot. 
European Journal of Social Psychology 37.1102-1117 
Davenport, J.L. and Potter, M.C. 2004. Scene consistency in object and background perception. Psychological 
Science 15:559-564 
Dogramaci, S. 2012. Reverse engineering epistemic evaluations.Philosophy and Phenomenological 
Research, 84(3), 513-530. 
Drew, T., Vo, M. & Wolfe, J. 2013. The invisible gorilla strikes again: Sustained inattentional blindness in expert 
observers. Pyschological Science 24 1848-1853 
Elfenbein, H. A., & Ambady, N. 2003. When familiarity breeds accuracy: cultural exposure and facial emotion 
recognition. Journal of personality and social psychology, 85(2), 276. 
Feldman, J. 2014. Bayesian Models of Perceptual Organization in J. Wagemans (ed.) Oxford Handbook of 
Perceptual Organization 
Feldman, R. and Conee, E. 1985. Evidentialism. Philosophical Studies 48.1: 15-34 
Firestone, C. and Scholl, B. Forthcoming. “Cognition does not affect perception: evaluation the evidence for ‘top-
down’ effects” Behavioral and Brain Sciences  
Fiske, S. T., & Linville, P. W. (1980). What does the schema concept buy us?.Personality and Social Psychology 
Bulletin, 6(4), 543-557. 
Fodor, J. 1983. The Modularity of Mind. MIT.  
Gendler, T. 2011. On the epistemic costs of implicit bias. Philosophical Studies 156.1:33-63 
Gibson, J.J. (1979). The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception. Houghton Mifflin. 
Goldmam A. 1979, “What Is Justified Belief?” in G.S. Pappas (ed.), Justification and Knowledge, Dordrecht: 
Reidel, pp. 1–25. 
Goldman, A. 1986. Epistemology and Cognition, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Goldstone, R. L. 1998. Perceptual learning. Annual review of psychology,49(1), 585-612. 
 Page 40 of 42	
Goldstone, R. L., de Leeuw, J. R., & Landy, D. H. 2015. Fitting perception in and to cognition. Cognition, 135, 
24–29. 
Grossberg, S., & Mingolla, E. 1994. Visual motion perception. Encyclopedia of human behavior, 4, 469-486. 
Haslanger, S. 2012. Resisting reality: Social construction and social critique. Oxford University Press. 
Hempel, C. G. 1965. Aspects of scientific explanation and other essays in the philosophy of science. New York. 
Hoffman, D. 1998. Visual Intelligence: How We Create What We See. Norton. 
Huemer, M. 2001. Skepticism and the Veil of Perception. Rowman and Littlefield. 
Jussim, L., Cain, T., Crawford, J., Harber, K., & Cohen, F.  2009. The unbearable accuracy of stereotypes.  Pp. 
199-227 in T. Nelson (ed.), Handbook of prejudice, stereotyping and discrimination. Erlbaum 
Kahneman, D. & Tversky, A. 1973. On the psychology of prediction. Psychological Review. 80:237-251 
Kelly, D. J., Quinn, P. C., Slater, A. M., Lee, K., Ge, L., & Pascalis, O. 2007. The other-race effect develops 
during infancy: Evidence of perceptual narrowing. Psychological Science, 18(12), 1084-1089. 
Kelly, T. 2008. Evidence: Fundamental concepts and the phenomenal conception. Philosophy Compass, 3(5), 
933-955. 
Klingberg, T. 2000. Limitations in information processing in the human brain: neuroimaging of dual task 
performance and working memory tasks. Progress in brain research, 126, 95-102. 
Lee, Y-T., Jussim, L. and McCauley, C.R. 1995. Stereotype Accuracy: Toward Appreciating Group Differences 
APA 
Ludwig, K. A. 2006. Is the aim of perception to provide accurate representations? In Robert J. 
Lupyan, G. 2012. Linguistically modulated perception and cognition: The label-feedback hypothesis. Frontiers in 
Psychology, 3, Article 54. 
Lyons, J. 2009, Perception and Basic Beliefs: Zombies, Modules, and the Problem of the External World, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
Lyons, Jack 2011. Circularity, reliability, and the cognitive penetrability of perception. Philosophical Issues 21 
(1):289-311. 
Macpherson, F. 2012. Cognitive Penetration of Colour Experience: Rethinking the Issue in Light of an Indirect 
Mechanism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (1):24-62. 
Madon, S. J.,  Jussim, L., Keiper, S., Eccles, J., Smith, A., & Palumbo, P.   1998. The accuracy and power of sex, 
social class and ethnic stereotypes: Naturalistic studies in person perception. Personality and Social 
Psychology Bulletin 24 1304-1318. 
Mamassian, P., Landy, M., & Maloney, L. T. 2002. Bayesian modelling of visual perception. Probabilistic 
models of the brain, 13-36. 
Marchi, F. 2016. Attention and cognitive penetrability: The epistemic consequences of attention as a form of 
metacognitive regulation. Consciousness and Cognition online 7/7/2016 
Marois, R., & Ivanoff, J. 2005. Capacity limits of information processing in the brain. Trends in cognitive 
sciences, 9(6), 296-305. 
 Page 41 of 42	
Meissner, C. A., & Brigham, J. C. 2001. Thirty years of investigating the own-race bias in memory for faces: A 
meta-analytic review. Psychology, Public Policy and Law 7(1): 3-35 
Mills, Charles (2007). White Ignorance. In Shannon Sullivan Nancy Tuana (ed.), Race and Epistemologies of 
Ignorance. State Univ of New York Pr. pp. 11--38. 
Morgenstern, Y. Murray, R.F. and Harris, L.R. 2011. The human visual system’s assumption that light comes 
from above is weak. PNAS 108.30: 12551-12553 
Olivia, A. and Torralba, A. 2007. The role of context in object recognition. Trends in Cognitive Science 11.12: 
520-527 
Orlandi, N. 2014. The Innocent Eye: Why Vision is Not a Cognitive Process. OUP  
Orlandi, N. Forthcoming. Bayesian perception is ecological perception. Philosophical Topics 44.2 
Palmer, S.E. 1975. The effects of contextual scenes on the identification of objects. Memory and Congition 3:519-
526 
Payne, B. K. 2001. Prejudice and perception: the role of automatic and controlled processes in misperceiving a 
weapon. Journal of personality and social psychology, 81(2), 181. 
Payne, B. K., Shimizu, Y., & Jacoby, L. L. 2005. Mental control and visual illusions: Toward explaining race-
biased weapon identifications. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 41, 36-47 
Phillips, J., Luguri, J. B., & Knobe, J. 2015. Unifying morality’s influence on non-moral judgments: The 
relevance of alternative possibilities. Cognition,145, 30-42. 
Poggio, T., & Ullman, S. (2013). Vision: are models of object recognition catching up with the brain?. Annals of 
the New York Academy of Sciences,1305(1), 72-82. 
Pritchard, D. 2007. “Anti-Luck Epistemology.” Synthese 158: 277-98. 
Pryor, J. 2000. The Skeptic and the Dogmatist. Nous 34:4 517-549 
Pylyshyn, Z. 1999. Is vision continuous with cognition? The case for cognitive impenetrability of visual 
perception. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (3):341-365. 
Rescorla, M. 2015. Bayesian Perceptual Psychology. In M. Matthen (ed.) The Oxford Handbook of the 
Philosophy of Perception. OUP 
Scholl, B. J. 2005. Innateness and (Bayesian) visual perception: Reconciling nativism and development. In P. 
Carruthers, S. Laurence, & S. Stich (Eds.), The structure of the innate mind. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.  
Siegel, S. 2012. Cognitive Penetrability and Perceptual Justification. Nous 46.2 201-222 
Siegel, S. 2013. The Epistemic Impact of the Etiology of Experience. Philosophical Studies 162:697-722 
Siegel, S. 2013b. Can Selection Effects on Experience Influence its Rational Role. In T. Gendler (ed.) Oxford 
Studies in Epistemology Vol. 4 Oxford University Press 
Siegel, S. 2017. The Rationality of Perception. Oxford University Press.  
Sosa, E. 1999. “How must knowledge be modally related to what is known?” Philosophical Topics 26 (1&2): 
373-384. 
 Page 42 of 42	
Sosa, E. 2007. A Virtue Epistemology. Oxford University Press. 
Stefanucci, J. K., Gagnon, K. T., & Lessard, D. A. 2011. Follow your heart: Emotion adaptively influences 
perception. Social and Personality Psychology Compass, 5, 296–308. 
Stokes, D. 2012. Perceiving and Desiring: A New Look at the Cognitive Penetrability of 
Experience. Philosophical Studies 158 (3):479-92. 
Stokes, D. 2013. Cognitive Penetrability of Perception. Philosophy Compass 8 (7):646-663. 
Stone, J.V., Kerrigan, I.S., Porrill, J. 2009. Where is the light? Bayesian perceptual priors for lighting direction. 
Proc. R. Soc. B. 276: 1797-1804 
Strohminger, M. (2015). Perceptual Knowledge of Nonactual Possibilities. Philosophical Perspectives 29 (1):363-
75. 
Summerfield, C. and Egner, T. 2009. Expectation (and attention) in visual cognition. Trends in Cognitive Science 
13.9: 403-409 
Teufel, C. Subramaniam, N. and Fletcher, P.C. 2013. The role of priors in Bayesian models of perception. 
Frontiers in Computational Neuroscience 7.25:1-2 
Torralba, A., Oliva, A., Castelhano, M.S. and Henderson, J.M. 2006. Contextual guidance of eye movements and 
attention in real-world sense: The role of global features on object search. Psychological Review 113.4: 
766-86 
Valentine, T. 1991. A unified account of the effects of distinctiveness, inversion, and race in face recognition. The 
Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 43(2), 161-204. 
Valentine, T., Lewis, M. B., & Hills, P. J. 2016. Face-space: A unifying concept in face recognition research. The 
Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 69(10), 1996-2019. 
Ward, E. J. & Scholl, B. J. 2015. Inattentional blindness reflects limitations on perception, not memory: Evidence 
from repeated failures of awareness. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review. 23, 797-802. 
Warren, W.H. 2005. Direct perception: The View from here. Philosophical Topics 33.1: 335-361 
Warren, W.H. 2012. Does this computational theory solve the right problem? Marr Gibson, and the goal of vision. 
perception 41.9 1053-1060 
Williamson, T. 2000. Knowledge and its Limits. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Woodman, G. F., Carlisle, N. B., & Reinhart, R. M. 2013. Where do we store the memory representations that 
guide attention?. Journal of Vision, 13(3), 1-1. 
Wu, W. 2013. Visual spatial constancy and modularity: Does intention penetrate vision? Philosophical 
Studies 165 (2):647-669. 
 
 
